Deciphering German telegraphic traffic was a challenge that initially both teams worked on together. The War Office had its own team dealing with signals intelligence, MO5b, later called MI1b. German naval and diplomatic communications were decoded by the Admiralty in Room 40, the centre of Naval Intelligence codebreaking in the First World War. David Kahn, the cryptographic historian, has said that ‘No other single cryptanalysis has had such enormous consequences.’ Signals intelligence in the First World War On April 2, 1917, Wilson asked Congress to declare war on Germany, stating, ‘The world must be made safe for democracy,’and war was declared on Germany on 6 April. The doubt ended when Zimmermann acknowledged authorship. Some believed that the telegram was Allied propaganda and a fake. Shortly afterwards reports of the telegram issued in the American press. On 24 February 1917 Britain released the message to President Wilson. Although they did not declare war, the environment was now more receptive to change. On 3 February, America broke off diplomatic relations with Germany following the German resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare. By handing over the decoded version sent via the German Embassy in Washington to Mexico, the British Government hoped to hide the fact that the message had been intercepted, so that it would appear that the document had been leaked in Mexico instead. The answer was that there were several copies of the telegram, with slightly different language. Only when the Admiralty found a solution to this was the decrypted telegram sent to the Foreign Secretary, Arthur Balfour. If the Germans then became aware of this and changed their codes, the intelligence advantage would be lost. The Americans would not appreciate the thought that their signals might also be collected. Whilst the British authorities wanted to pass this information to the Americans, to do so would reveal that communications were being intercepted. Unbeknown to Germany, British Naval Intelligence had intercepted the telegram and deciphered it. The proposal, which built on poor US- Mexican relations, was refused. In order to 'sweeten the deal', Zimmerman suggested that Mexico would get back her lost territories in Texas, New Mexico and Arizona when Germany won the war. It indicated that the new policy on submarine warfare might bring Germany and the USA into conflict, and asked if, in such an event, Mexico would be willing to fight on the German side. It was for this reason that, on 16 January 1917 Zimmermann sent a pre-emptive telegram to the Mexican Government. This policy was bound to antagonise the Americans. Nevertheless, owing to the effect of the Allied blockade combined with a poor harvest, Germany felt forced to take drastic action, including the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare on 1 February 1917. Britain was actively trying to influence America in favour of entering the war on the Allied side, and Germany was conscious of the risks that US entry to the war would pose. Neutrality was still important to the United States at this point - it was the platform on which President Woodrow Wilson was re-elected in November 1916. However, this bias was tempered by British efforts to block trade with Germany. A 100 hundred years ago today the German Foreign Minister, Arthur Zimmermann, sent a telegram that was to have profound consequences for the course of the First World War.Īt the beginning of 1917 American opinion was anti-German, and largely in favour of Britain and her allies.
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